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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
ARTHUR GENE SCHMIERER,
Defendant-Appellant.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)

DOCKET NO. 40733
Canyon Co. Case No.
CR-2009-1259
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REVIEW

)

)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state requests review of the Idaho Court of Appeals' November 25,
2014 opinion in which the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of conviction
and sentence for the second count of enticing children over the Internet. State v.
Schmierer, Docket No. 40733, 2014 Opinion No. 98 (Idaho App., Nov. 25, 2014)
(hereinafter "Opinion").
Review of the Opinion is appropriate because the Opinion has decided a
question of substance not heretofore determined by the Idaho Supreme Court,
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and/or is not in accord with Idaho Supreme Court precedent and is in conflict with
previous decisions of the Idaho Court of Appeals. For the Court's convenience, a
copy of the Opinion is attached hereto as Appendix A.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings In District Court
In 2009, a Canyon County grand jury charged Schmierer in a Superseding
Indictment ("Indictment") with enticing children over the internet (Count I) and
attempted lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen (Count 11). 1 (R., pp.27-29.)
Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, accepted by the district court,
Schmierer pied guilty to Count I and to an amended Count II, which charged a
second incident of enticing a child through use of the Internet; the parties and
court agreed that Schmierer would be sentenced to two consecutive five-year
fixed terms, for a total of ten years fixed, and that any indeterminate time would
be left open.

(R., pp.52-59; Tr., p.7, L.14 - p.18, L.17.)

The United States

Attorney's Office agreed to refrain from filing additional charges (R., pp.52-59;
Tr., p.12, Ls.5-12), and Schmierer agreed to "waive any possible deficiencies in
the original charging" (Tr., p.8, Ls.2-8). Count II of the Indictment was amended
by the prosecutor presenting the court an Amended Superseding Indictment
("Amended Indictment"). (R., pp.49-51; Tr., p.7, L.23 - p.9, L.9.) The state did
not obtain a probable cause determination by the grand jury on the amended
charge. (R., p.107 ("The Amended Superseding Indictment was not signed by
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Count II of the Indictment, attempted lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen,
was based on Schmierer using a telephone to set up a meeting with a supposed
13 year-old girl -- actually an undercover adult female agent of Idaho's Internet
Crimes Against Children Task Force -- in order to engage in intimate sexual acts
with her, and driving to the arranged location for that purpose. (R., pp.7-8.)
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the Grand Jury.").)

The district court sentenced Schmierer as agreed upon,

adding that the two sentences would be for ten years unified on each count, with
five years fixed (consecutive). (R., pp.60-63, 66-67.)
In 2012, Schmierer filed an "IRC [sic] 35 Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentences," arguing that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
to convict him under Count II of the Amended Indictment because probable
cause had not been established by the grand jury for that count. (R., pp.72-85.)
After the state filed a response to Schmierer's Rule 35 motion (R., pp.86-95), the
court held a hearing on the motion, and subsequently entered an Order Denying
Rule 35 Motion, explaining, in part:
Here, Defendant specifically waived any defects in the
charging document.
He agreed to the amendment to the
Indictment that reduced the attempted Lewd and Lascivious
conduct charge to a lesser charge. Having made such a waiver he
cannot now claim that his sentence on the "Amended Indictment"
was illegal.
(R., p.108; see 2/5/13 Tr., p.3, L.20- p.4, L.15.)
Schmierer filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.102-104.)

Course Of Proceedings On Appeal
On appeal, Schmierer argued that "the prosecutor's amendment of the
indictment, without resubmitting the matter to the grand jury, was without legal
authorization and, therefore, failed to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
district court as to Count 11." (Opinion, p.2.) The Court of Appeals reversed, first
explaining that the state "asks this Court to hold that a prosecutor may amend an
indictment to charge a different crime where the defendant agrees to the
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amendment and to plead guilty without a probable cause determination."
(Opinion, p.6 (emphasis added).) The Court of Appeals commented, "[p]erhaps
allowing such an amendment is the better rule; however, neither I.C. § 19-1420
nor I.C.R. 7(e) provides an exception to their ban on amendment of an indictment
to allege a different crime.
exception." (Id.)

Our appellate courts have not provided such an

The Court of Appeals noted that in State v. Severson, 147

Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 414, 430 (2009), this Court concluded, "'[b]ecause the
amended indictment did not charge Severson with a new offense or result in
prejudice, the amendment was permissible under principles of due process and
Rule 7(e)[,]"' and that in State. v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 530, 261 P.3d 519, 524
(2011 ), this Court concluded, "'because the amended indictment charged a
different crime than the crime charged in the original indictment, the amended
indictment is a nullity."' (Opinion, p.6.) The Court of Appeals finally held:
The State was without authority to file the amended
indictment. ... Where an indictment is invalid, the district court is
without subject matter jurisdiction. . . . Therefore, not having been
issued by a grand jury, the amended indictment was invalid, and
the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction over the
second count of Internet enticement.
(Opinion, p.6.) The state filed a timely petition for review.
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ISSUES ON REVIEW

Is review proper because the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision that the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Count II of the Amended
Indictment, based on its conclusion that Schmierer was not entitled to waive his
right to a probable cause finding by the grand jury, presents a question of
substance not heretofore determined by this Court and is not in accord with this
Court's and prior Court of Appeals' precedent?
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ARGUMENT
Review Is Appropriate Because The Court Of Appeals' Conclusion That The
District Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Count II Of The Amended
Indictment Relies On An Incorrect Determination That Schmierer Could Not
Waive A Probable Cause Finding By The Grand Jury On That Count

A

Introduction
The district court held that, by pleading guilty to the Amended Indictment

pursuant to a plea agreement, Schmierer waived any defects in the charging
document and he "agreed to the amendment to the Indictment that reduced the
attempted Lewd and Lascivious conduct charge to a lesser charge." (R., p.108;
see 2/5/13 Tr., p.3, L.20 - p.4, L.15.) The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding
that, without a grand jury determination of probable cause on the second count of
the Amended Indictment, the district court lacked authority to file the amended
count; therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in regard to the
amended second count.

(Opinion, p.6.) The Court of Appeals' decision answers

a question of substance not heretofore determined by the Supreme Court and is
not in accord with this Court's and prior Court of Appeals' precedent. I.AR. 118
(b).

Correct application of existing precedent shows Count II of the Amended

Indictment gave the district court subject matter jurisdiction because it alleged
Schmierer committed an offense in the state of Idaho, and, by pleading guilty,
Schmierer waived his right to have the grand jury make a probable cause
determination.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised at

anytime and is subject to de novo review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757,
6

101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004) (citing Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469,471, 903 P.2d
58, 60 (1995) and State v. Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095, 1097
(1998)).

In reviewing an Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion, "this Court gives

serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews
the decision of the lower court." State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d
182, 183 (2009) (quotations and citation omitted).

C.

Pursuant To Prior Decisions By This Court And The Court Of Appeals,
The District Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction In Regard To Count II
Of The Amended Indictment
The Court of Appeals' Opinion that the district court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over Count II of the Amended Indictment is not in accord with its own
prior decisions or those of the Idaho Supreme Court. Review of the amended
Count II, and the point in the proceeding in which the Indictment was amended,
shows it bestowed subject matter jurisdiction on the district court.
It is well established that it is the charging document that confers
jurisdiction on a district court.

State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d

1127, 1133 (2004) (''The information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense
was committed within the state of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon
the court.") (citing State v. Slater, 71 Idaho 335, 338, 231 P.2d 424, 425 (1951)).
An Indictment confers jurisdiction in a criminal case if it alleges an offense was
committed within the State of Idaho. State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 621, 115
P.3d 710, 712 (2005). Whether the Indictment is sufficient to satisfy due process
is a separate question, unrelated to whether the court has jurisdiction. kl_; State
v. Murray, 143 Idaho 532, 536, 148 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Ct. App. 2006) (noting the
7

Idaho Supreme Court has "clearly differentiat[ed] between due process and
jurisdictional queries").

Thus, the sole question relevant to the jurisdictional

analysis is whether the Amended Indictment alleged an offense in the State of
Idaho. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757-758, 101 P.3d 699, 701-702 (2004).
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the amended Count II is incorrect. That count alleged
that Schmierer committed the crime of enticing a child through use of the
internet, in violation of I.C. § 18-1509A, 2 and in the State of Idaho, as follows:
That the Defendant, ARTHUR G. SCHMIERER, on or about
between November 22, 2008 and January 9, 2009, in the County of
Canyon, State of Idaho, did knowingly use the internet to solicit,
seduce, lure, persuade or entice by word or action or both, a
person Defendant believes to be a minor child under the age of
sixteen (16) years to engage in any sexual act with or against the
child where such act is a violation of Chapter 15, 61, or 66, Title 18,
Idaho Code, and that the Defendant is at least eighteen (18) years
old.
(R., p.50.)

2

I.C. § 18-1509A reads in relevant part:
(1) a person aged eighteen (18) years or older shall be guilty of a
felony if such person knowingly uses the internet or any device that
provides transmission of messages, signals, facsimiles, video
images or other communication to solicit, seduce, lure, persuade or
entice by words or actions, or both, a person under the age of
sixteen (16) years or a person the defendant believes to be under
the age of sixteen (16) years to engage in any sexual act with or
against the person where such act would be a violation of chapter
15, 61 or 66, title 18, Idaho Code.

(5) The offense is committed in the state of Idaho for purposes of
determining jurisdiction if the transmission that constitutes the
offense either originates in or is received in the state of Idaho.
8

The state recognizes that in Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530, 261 P.3d at 524,
this Court stated, "[b]ecause the amended indictment charged a different crime
than the crime charged in the original indictment, the amended indictment is a
nullity." However, the defendant in Flegel had been acquitted by a jury of the
only count of the Indictment, lewd conduct with a child under sixteen years of
age, and the jury was unable to reach a verdict on what the trial court
erroneously deemed an "included offense," sexual abuse of a child under
sixteen.

Flegel, 151 Idaho at 526, 530-531, 261 P.3d at 520, 524-525. After

Flegel was convicted by a jury on re-trial of the sexual abuse charge, this Court
concluded, "[n]ot having been issued by a grand jury, the amended indictment
was invalid, the district court never had subject matter jurisdiction over Flegel's
case regarding the charge of Sexual Abuse, and this case must therefore be
dismissed." Flegel, 151 Idaho at 531, 261 P.3d at 525.
In Flegel, the Indictment was a completely dead letter by the time the
prosecutor attempted to amend it after the first trial. See State v. Lute, 150 Idaho
837, 841, 252 P.3d 1255, 1259 (2011) (where the grand jury term had expired, "a
valid indictment was never entered against Lute, the district court never had
subject matter jurisdiction over Lute's case under Article I, section 8 of the Idaho
Constitution."). Here, in contrast, the original Indictment giving the district court
subject matter jurisdiction over Schmierer remained in full force and effect up to
the moment the prosecutor amended Count II with Schmierer's consent.
discussed below,

As

Schmierer had the right to waive a probable cause

determination by the grand jury on the amended count, and, unlike the defendant
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in Flegel, he implicitly did so by accepting the plea agreement and pleading guilty
in accordance with it.

There is nothing about the amended Count II or the

manner in which probable cause was established (i.e., by waiver), which
precluded the district court from having subject matter jurisdiction over that count.
Inasmuch as Count II of the Amended Indictment charged that an existing
Idaho crime was committed by Schmierer in the State of Idaho (R., p.50), there
was nothing facially deficient about that amended count. 3

Further, unlike in

Flegel, subject matter jurisdiction over Schmierer's Indictment had not expired
when the prosecutor amended it pursuant to a plea agreement whereby
Schmierer implicitly waived a probable cause determination by the grand jury.
Accordingly, there was no jurisdictional defect and the court had subject matter
jurisdiction in regard to Count II, as amended. The Court of Appeals' decision
runs contrary to its own and this Court's previous decisions.

D.

Indicted Defendants May Waive A Grand Jury Determination Of Probable
Cause In Regard To New Substantive Charges, And The District Court
Does Not Lose Subject Matter Jurisdiction By Such Amendment
The reason for having an Indictment is to establish a finding of probable

cause.

Article 1, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution guarantees criminal

defendants the right to a finding of probable cause either through a grand jury or
a preliminary hearing. See State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 912 P.2d 664 (Ct.

3

Although the district court did not base its denial of Schmierer's Rule 35 motion
to correct an illegal sentence on the same reasons expressed here, its ruling
should nonetheless be affirmed on appeal on the correct theory. See Row v.
State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21 P.3d 895, 901 (2001) ("Where the lower court
reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory" this Court can apply "the
correct theory" and affirm).
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App. 1995).

Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e) continues the parallel treatment of

Informations and Indictments, stating, "The court may permit a complaint, an
information or indictment to be amended at any time before the prosecution rests
if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the
defendant are not prejudiced."

There is no meaningful difference between

whether probable cause is determined by a magistrate court through an
Information, or by a grand jury through an Indictment. With regard to preliminary
hearings, it is well-established that a defendant's right to a probable cause
determination can be waived. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 912 P.2d 664; see also
State v. Fowler, 105 Idaho 642, 643, 671 P.2d 1105, 1106 (Ct. App. 1983). The
same should hold true for substantive amendments to Indictments. See United
States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002) ("In contrast" to defects in subjectmatter jurisdiction, "the grand jury right can be waived."); Short v. United States,
471 F.3d 686, 695 (6 th Cir. 2006) ("In light of this modern shift in the procedural
rules and recent caselaw, we conclude that a defendant may waive his right to
reindictment by a grand jury. We confine this holding, however, to the present
circumstance concerning a guilty plea to the amended indictment .... "); 4 People
v. Curry, 210 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Mich.App. 1973) (stating, where the Indictment
was amended to charge a new offense, "[w]e hold that the trial court had
jurisdiction to accept defendant's plea to the amended indictment.").

4

Idaho's appellate courts are not bound by federal decisions concerning subject
matter jurisdiction in relation to the right to have a grand jury determine probable
cause for an amended court of an Indictment. See State v. Murray, 143 Idaho
532, 535, 148 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Ct. App. 2006.) ("This Court is not free to adopt
Cotton as Idaho law, however, because we must adhere to Idaho criminal rules
and precedent set by the Idaho Supreme Court.").
11

The Court of Appeals correctly noted that the state asked it "to hold that a
prosecutor may amend an indictment to charge a different crime where the
defendant agrees to the amendment and to plead guilty without a probable cause
determination."

(Opinion, p.6.)

However, the Court of Appeals did not fully

analyze why defendants may waive a probable cause determination when an
Information is amended with a new substantive charge, but not when a similar
amendment is made to an Indictment. The Court of Appeals appears to have
reasoned that because Flegel and Severson (together) require a grand jury
finding of probable cause for amended counts to an Indictment charging new
offenses, the district court lacked jurisdiction over Amended Count II because it
charged a new offense without a grand jury finding of probable cause. 5 (Opinion,
p.6.)

5

The Court of Appeals explained:
Perhaps allowing such an amendment is the better rule;
however, neither I.C. § 19-1420 nor I.C.R. 7(e) provides an
exception to their ban on amendment of an indictment to allege a
different crime.
Our appellate courts have not provided an
exception. Ultimately in Severson, the Court held, "Because the
amended indictment did not charge Severson with a new offense or
result in prejudice, the amendment was permissible under
principles of due process and Rule 7(e)." Severson, 147 Idaho at
710, 215 P.3d at 430. In Flegel, the Court held that "because the
amended indictment charged a different crime than the crime
charged in the original indictment, the amended indictment is a
nullity." Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530, 261 P.3d at 524. Here, the
amended indictment did charge Schmierer with a new offense -enticing children over the Internet -- which was different from the
original offense charged -- attempted lewd conduct with a minor -and therefore, the amended indictment in Count II was invalid.

(Opinion, p.6.)
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The Court of Appeals' reliance upon Flegel and Severson is misplaced
because both cases involved jury trials following the state's unilateral amendment
of the Indictments.

In contrast, Schmierer entered into a plea agreement

whereby he agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge and did so at the time
of the amendment. 6 (See Opinion, pp.5-6; see generally 5/8/09 Tr.) The state
does not dispute the general rule that an amended count to an Indictment that
charges a new substantive offense is subject to a defendant's right to have
probable cause determined by a grand jury. However, whether such a right may
be waived by a defendant was not analyzed in any depth by the Court of
Appeals, and has never been directly addressed by this Court.
It is undisputed that the original Indictment gave the district court subject
matter jurisdiction over Schmierer, and that jurisdiction continued up to the time
the prosecutor amended Count II of the Indictment. The only thing lacking with
regard to the amendment of Count II was a grand jury finding of probable cause
to believe Schmierer committed the crime of enticing children over the Internet,
and that it occurred in Idaho.

(See n.5, supra, re: Flegel.)

Inasmuch as

Schmierer had the right to have a grand jury determine probable cause, this

6

The jury acquitted Flegel of lewd conduct with a child under sixteen, but could
not reach a verdict on a crime this Court later found had been erroneously
presented to the jury as an included offense, sexual abuse of a child under
sixteen. Because the state did not present the latter charge to the grand jury for
a probable cause determination, "the amended indictment was invalid, the district
court never had subject matter jurisdiction over Flegel's case regarding the
charge of Sexual Abuse .... " Flegel, 151 Idaho at 531,261 P.3d at 525.
In Severson, also involving a jury trial, the amended Indictment did not
require submission to the grand jury because it did not charge Severson with a
new offense. Severson, 147 Idaho at 710, 215 P.3d at 430.
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Court should conclude that he also had the right to waive that determination.
There is no principled reason that Schmierer, if charged by Information, would
have the right to waive a probable cause determination, but could not waive such
a determination if charged by Indictment.
This Court should accept review to resolve this issue and hold that, just as
a defendant charged in an Information has the right to waive a probable cause
finding by the magistrate court when an amended and new substantive count is
filed, an indicted defendant has the same right -- nothing makes the waiver of a
probable cause determination in magistrate court more worthy of subject matter
jurisdiction status than waiver of the same finding by a grand jury.

E.

Schmierer's Guilty Plea, Entered Pursuant To A Plea Agreement,
Effectively Waived His Right To A Grand Jury Finding Of Probable Cause
It is well settled that a valid plea of guilty, voluntarily and understandingly

given, waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, whether constitutional
or statutory, in prior proceedings. State v. Dunlap, 123 Idaho 396, 399, 848 P.2d
454, 457 (Ct. App. 1993); Fowler, 105 Idaho at 643, 671 P. 2d at 1106.

In

Fowler, the defendant asked the court to overturn his conviction because of a
defect in the preliminary hearing process.

Fowler claimed "the magistrate

committed prejudicial error in letting the state amend the complaint against him -to include the restaurant burglary charge -- during the course of the preliminary
hearing."

Fowler, 105 Idaho at 643, 671 P.2d at 1106.

The Idaho Court of

Appeals concluded Fowler waived his right to challenge the probable cause
determination regarding the added charge once he pied guilty:
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[W)e hold that Fowler's plea of guilty to that new charge waived his
right to contest the preliminary hearing procedure. The purpose of
a preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is probable
cause to require the accused to stand trial. It is well settled that a
valid plea of guilty, voluntarily and understandingly given, waives all
non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, whether constitutional or
statutory, in prior proceedings. Here Fowler does not attack the
entry and acceptance of his plea. His plea of guilty to the
restaurant burglary therefore constituted a waiver of the procedure
to determine probable cause, just as if he had waived the
preliminary hearing itself, on that charge.
Fowler, 105 Idaho at 643, 671 P.2d at 1106 (emphasis added, internal citations
omitted). Here, the claimed defect is in the grand jury process, not the
preliminary hearing process.

Nevertheless, the intents and purposes of these

two events are the same -- they both determine whether the state has sufficient
cause, probable cause, to hold the person for trial. There is no reasoned basis
why a defendant can waive that probable cause determination in one proceeding
and not in another.
Although Count II of the Amended Indictment charged Schmierer with
committing a different offense than the original Count II, because Schmierer
waived any possible deficiencies in the original charging (5/8/09 Tr., p.8, Ls.2-8)
and voluntarily pied guilty to the amended count pursuant to a plea agreement,
he waived his right to have the grand jury make a probable cause finding in
regard to it. 7 Schmierer has failed to show that his right to have Count II of the

7

Immediately after the prosecutor presented the Amended Superseding
Indictment and the proposed plea agreement to the district court on May 8, 2009,
Schmierer entered a guilty plea to Counts I and 11 of the Amended Indictment
pursuant to the binding Rule 11 plea agreement. (R., pp.52-59; Tr., p.7, L.14 p.18, L.17.) The agreement called for Schmierer to plead guilty to the original
Count I and the amended Count II -- charging enticing a child through use of the
internet instead of the charge of attempted lewd conduct with a minor under
15

Amended Indictment screened for probable cause was violated.

Accordingly,

Schmierer failed to show any error in the district court's denial of his Rule 35
motion for correction of an illegal sentence.
By way of illustration, in Short v. United States, 471 F.3d 686 (2006), the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the same issue presented to this Court.
After concluding that "a defendant may waive his right to reindictment by a grand
jury" in "the present circumstance concerning a guilty plea to the amended
indictment," the Sixth Circuit considered "whether Short's plea colloquy effected a
valid waiver of his right to reindictment." Short, 471 F.3d at 695.

The Sixth

Circuit noted that, under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 7(b), "courts have found that a
waiver can be implied by a defendant's guilty-plea colloquy in open court."

1st

The Short decision initially noted that "[n]othing in the record ... indicates that
the court specifically informed Short of his right to be reindicted by a grand jury,
id. at 690, and ultimately indirectly held that Short's guilty plea impliedly waived
his right to reindictment on the amended count of the Indictment, explaining:
The record reflects that the district court asked Short's
counsel, in the presence of Short and in open court, whether there
was any objection to the amendment of Short's indictment. Short's
counsel replied that there was not, and Short himself raised no
objection. Furthermore, the court repeatedly explained to Short
during the plea colloquy the amended charge to which he was
pleading guilty and the penalty it carried. Thus, as the court in
Ornelas [v. United States, 840 F.2d 890 (11 th Cir. 1988)] explained,
the district court's failure to specifically inform Short of his right to

sixteen -- and to be sentenced to a minimum of two consecutive five-year fixed
terms, for a total of ten years fixed. (Tr., p.7, L.14 - p.11, L.22; R., pp.52-58.)
Schmierer agreed to "waive any possible deficiencies in the original charging and
plead to that second count, as well as the first count." (Tr., p.8, Ls.2-8.)
16

reindictment was, at most, only a "technical violation of Rule 7(b)."
[Citing Ornelas.]
The district court thoroughly explained the amended charge
to Short before accepting his guilty plea. It also inquired whether
he had any objection to the amendment, which he did not. Thus,
any technical error related to the amendment of his indictment did
not amount to per se prejudice.
Instead, the amended
indictment negotiated by Short's attorney secured for Short
precisely the 10-year sentence that he was willing to accept.
Short, 471 F.3d at 695 (explanations added).
As in Short, although Schmierer was not informed of his right to have the
grand jury determine probable cause on the amended count, he and his trial
counsel agreed in open court to the proposed plea agreement and the
substantive amendment of the Indictment without any objection. (5/8/09 Tr., p.7,
L.23- p.10, L.4); see Curry, 210 N.W.2d at 793 (rule that "objection is required to
preserve the right to complain on appeal about defects in the information" applied
to "hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to accept defendant's plea to the
amended indictment."). The district court explained the terms of the Rule 11 plea
agreement and the possible penalties in regard to the amended count, which
Schmierer indicated he understood. (5/8/09 Tr., p.9, L.5 - p.15, L.10.) The court
informed Schmierer of the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty (5/8/09 Tr.,
p.15, L.5 - p.16, L.14), and Schmierer disavowed any threats or promises (apart
from the plea agreement) had been made to him to get him to plead guilty (5/8/09
Tr., p.17, Ls.3-9).

Finally, Schmierer admitted each element of the amended

count and pied guilty to enticing children over the internet. (5/8/09 Tr., p.17, L.21
-p.18,L.17.)
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Considering the colloquy between the district court and Schmierer upon
entry of his guilty plea to the amended Count II, this Court should conclude that,
analogous to the preliminary hearing situation in Fowler, Schmierer's guilty plea
to a new count of the Indictment also effectively waived his right to a probable
cause determination.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
denying Schmierer's I.C.R. 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence.
DATED this 25 th day of January, 2015.
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